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We model power grids transporting electricity generated by intermittent renewable sources as
complex networks, where line failures can emerge indirectly by noisy power input at the nodes. By
combining concepts from statistical physics and the physics of power flows, and taking weather
correlations into account, we rank line failures according to their likelihood and establish the most
likely way such failures occur and propagate. Our insights are mathematically rigorous in a small-noise
limit and are validated with data from the German transmission grid.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc,89.20.-a,88.80.-q
Understanding cascading failures in complex networks
is of great importance and has received a lot of atten-
tion in recent years [1–17]. Despite proposing different
mechanisms for their evolution, a common feature is that
cascades are triggered by some external event. This initial
attack is chosen either (i) deliberately, to target the most
vulnerable or crucial network component or (ii) uniformly
at random, to understand the average network reliability.
This distinction led to the insight that complex networks
are resilient to random attacks, but vulnerable to targeted
attacks [7, 18, 19]. However, both lead to the direct failure
of the attacked network component.
In this Letter, we focus on networks in which edge fail-
ures occur in a fundamentally different manner. Specifi-
cally, we consider networks where fluctuations of the node
inputs can trigger edge failures. The realization (which
we call configuration) of the noise at the nodes is not only
the cause of edge failures, but can also impact the way
they propagate in the network.
We present our results in the context of power grids that
transport electricity generated by solar and wind parks.
In power grids, line failures can arise when the network
is driven from a stable state to a critically loaded state
by external factors; intermittent power generation at the
nodes causes random fluctuations in the line power flows,
possibly triggering outages and cascading failures. Thus,
line failures can emerge indirectly due to the interplay
between noisy correlated (due to weather) power input at
the nodes, the network structure, and power flow physics.
This interplay is challenging to analyze, yet this problem
is urgent as the penetration of renewable energy sources
is increasing [20, 21].
We analyze this interplay using statistical physics and
large deviations theory. We consider a parsimonious static
stochastic model similar to [22], introduce a scaling param-
eter ε describing the magnitude of the noise and consider
the regime ε→ 0. In the limit, we can identify the most
vulnerable lines and explicitly determine the most likely
configuration of power inputs leading to failures and sub-
sequent propagating failures. These results are validated
using real data for the German transmission network.
Previous works applying large-deviations techniques to
problems in complex networks dynamics, such as epidemic
extinction and biophysical networks, include [23, 24].
We model a transmission network by a connected graph
G with n nodes representing the buses and m directed
edges modeling transmission lines. The nominal val-
ues of net power injections at the nodes are given by
µ = {µi}i=1,...,n. We model the stochastic fluctuation
of the power injections around µ, due to variability in
renewable generation, by means of the random vector
p = {pi}i=1,...,n, which is assumed to follow a multivari-
ate Gaussian distribution with density
ϕ(x) = exp(−
1
2 (x− µ)T (εΣp)−1(x− µ))
(2pi)n2 det(εΣp)
1
2
, (1)
with εΣp ∈ Rn×n being the covariance matrix of p. In
our theoretical analysis, we assume that Σp is known and
let ε→ 0.
The Gaussian assumption is debatable, both for solar
and wind. While consistent with atmospheric physics [25]
and recent wind park statistics [26, 27], different models
are preferred for different timescales [28–31]. An extension
of our framework to the dynamic model in [31] looks
promising (using Freidlin-Wentzell theory as in [32]). For
a static non-Gaussian extension, see [33].
Assuming the vector µ has zero sum and using the DC
approximation [20], the line power flows f = {fi}i=1,...,m
are given by
f = Vp, (2)
where V is an m × n matrix encoding the grid topol-
ogy and parameters (i.e., line susceptances). The DC
approximation is commonly used in transmission system
analysis [34–37]. More realistic nonlinear models based
on AC power flows [38] may be analyzed leveraging the
contraction principle [39].
The total net power injected in the network
∑n
i=1 pi is
non-zero as p is random. Automated affine response and
redispatch mechanisms take care of this issue in power
grids. Mathematically, this corresponds to a “distributed
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2(a) Nominal line flows |ν`| at 11am. (b) True overload probabilities
log10 P(|f`| ≥ 1) at 11am.
(c) Top 5% of most likely lines to fail
(red) at 11am, according to (3), and
nominal injections from renewable
sources.
FIG. 1
slack” in our model: the total power injection mismatch
is distributed uniformly among all nodes (the matrix V
accounts for this; see [33]).
In view of Eqs. (1)-(2), the line power flows f also fol-
low a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean ν
and covariance matrix εΣf . The vector ν = Vµ ∈ Rm
describes the nominal line flows, while the covariance
matrix εΣf = εVΣpVT describes the correlations be-
tween line flows fluctuations, taking into account both
the correlations of the power injections (encoded by Σp)
and correlations created by the network topology due to
power flow physics (Kirchhoff’s laws) via V.
A line overloads if the absolute amount of power flowing
in it exceeds a given line threshold. We assume that such
overloads immediately lead to the outage of the corre-
sponding line, to which we will henceforth refer simply
as line failure. The rationale behind this assumption is
that there are security relays on high voltage transmis-
sion lines performing an emergency shutdown as soon
as the current exceeds a dangerous level. Without such
mechanisms, lines may overheat, sag and eventually trip.
We can express the line flows in units of the line thresh-
old by incorporating the latter in the definition of V [33],
so that f is the vector of normalized line power flows and
the failure of line ` corresponds to |f`| ≥ 1. We let the
power grid operate on average safely by assuming that
max`=1,...,m |ν`| < 1, so that only large fluctuations of
line flows lead to failures.
We are most interested in scenarios where power grids
are highly stressed, meaning that the nominal power
injections {µi}i=1,...,n are such that the corresponding
nominal line power flows {ν`}`=1,...,m are close to their
thresholds. Such a stress could be caused by very high
wind generation [40].
An illustrative scenario is reported in Fig. 1a, which
depicts a snapshot of nominal line flows on the SciGRID
German network [41]. SciGRID is a detailed model of the
actual German transmission network with n = 585 buses
and m = 852 lines that we use as main illustration. The
dataset includes load/generation time series, line limits,
grid topology and generation costs. In our case study,
we obtain µ by solving an Optimal Power Flow problem
(OPF [42]) based on realistic data for wind and solar
generation, and we estimate εΣp using ARMA models;
for details see the supplement [33], which also describes a
setting covering conventional controllable power plants.
We now turn to the analysis of emergent failures and
their propagation using large deviations theory [43]. We
begin by deriving the exponential decay of probabilities
of single line failure events |f`| ≥ 1 for ` = 1, . . . ,m. As
line power flows are Gaussian, we obtain, see Example
3.1 in [43], that
I` = − lim
ε→0
ε logPε(|f`| ≥ 1) = (1− |ν`|)
2
2σ2`
, (3)
where σ2` = (Σf )``. We call I` the decay rate of the failure
probability of line `. Thus, for small ε, we approximate
the probability of the emergent failure of line ` as
P(|f`| ≥ 1) ≈ exp(−I`/ε) = exp
(
− (1− |ν`|)
2
2εσ2`
)
, (4)
and that of the first emergent failure as
P(max
`
|f`| ≥ 1) ≈ exp(−min
`
I`/ε). (5)
These approximations for failure probabilities may not
be sharp in general, even when ε is small, since all terms
that are decaying subexponentially in 1/ε are ignored.
Nevertheless, Eq. (4) is quite useful for ranking purposes,
allowing to explicitly identify the lines that are most
likely to fail. To verify this empirically, we note that
the expression in Eq. (4) only depends on the product
εσ2` = ε(VΣpVT )``, and thus, ultimately, only on the
product εΣp, which in our case study we estimate directly
from the SciGRID data, see [33].
3Fig. S2 shows the heatmap for the exact line failure
probabilities P(|f`| ≥ 1), for the same day and hour as
in Fig. 1a: it is clear that a larger |ν`| does not neces-
sarily imply a higher chance of failure. Fig. 1c depicts
the 5% most likely lines to fail, ranked according to I`.
The ranking based on the large deviations approximation
successfully recovers the most likely lines to fail, and, in
fact, yields the same ordering as the one based on exact
probabilities [33], thus providing an accurate indicator of
system vulnerabilities.
Fig. 1c also illustrates the nominal renewable generation
mix: the buses housing stochastic power injections have
different colors (blue/light blue for wind offshore/onshore,
yellow for solar) and sizes proportional to the absolute
values of the corresponding nominal injections. Many
vulnerable lines are located where the most renewable
energy production occurs. However, the interplay between
network topology, power flows physics and correlation in
power injections caused by weather fluctuations, results
in a spread-out arrangement of vulnerable lines, which is
hard to infer by looking at nominal values only.
We proceed with an analysis of how emergent failures
occur, using again large deviations theory. In particular,
we provide an explicit estimate of the most likely power
injection that caused a specific emergent failure. To this
end, we fix a line ` and consider the conditional distribu-
tion of p, given |f`| ≥ 1. The mean of this distribution
greatly simplifies as ε→ 0 to
p(`) = arg inf
p∈Rn : |eˆT
`
Vp|≥1
1
2(p− µ)
TΣ−1p (p− µ). (6)
If ν` 6= 0, the solution is unique and reads
p(`) =µ+ (sign(ν`)− ν`)
σ2`
ΣpVT eˆ`, (7)
where sign(a) = 1 if a ≥ 0 and −1 otherwise, and eˆ` ∈ Rm
is the `-th unit vector. As ε→ 0, the conditional variance
of p given |f`| ≥ 1 decreases to 0 exponentially fast in
1/ε, yielding that the conditional distribution of p given
|f`| ≥ 1 gets sharply concentrated around p(`) [33].
We interpret p(`) as the most likely power injection pro-
file, conditional on the failure of line `. The corresponding
line power flow profile f (`) = Vp(`) is
f
(`)
k = νk +
(sign(ν`)− ν`)
σ2`
Cov(f`, fk), ∀ k 6= `. (8)
As such, our framework provides more explicit informa-
tion than the approach in [44], which approximates the
most likely way events happen using the mode, without
leveraging large deviations. In our validation experiments,
we found that the error between p(`) and E[ p | |f`| ≥ 1]
is typically less than 1% of the nominal values [33]. A
numerical illustration is given in Fig. 2b.
A key finding is that an emergent line failure does not
occur due to large fluctuations only in neighboring nodes,
but as a cumulative effect of small unusual fluctuations in
the entire network “summed up” by power flow physics,
and correlations in renewable energy. Such an emergent
failure requires every line flow to be driven to an unusual
state f (`)k , which deviates from the nominal value νk by
an amount proportional to the covariance Cov(f`, fk), in
view of Eq. (7).
We continue by investigating the propagation of failures,
combining our results describing the most likely power
injections configuration leading to the first failure, and
the power flow redistribution in the network afterwards.
To this end, we first differentiate between different types
of line failures, by assessing whether the most likely way
for failure of line ` to occur is as (i) an isolated failure, if
|f (`)k | < 1 for all line k 6= `, or (ii) a joint failure, if there
exists some other line k 6= ` such that |f (`)k | ≥ 1.
Any type of line failure(s) cause(s) a global redistri-
bution of the line power flows according to Kirchhoff’s
laws, which could trigger further outages and cascades. In
our setting, the power injections configuration p(`) redis-
tributes across an altered network G˜(`) (a subgraph of the
original graph G) in which line ` (and possible other lines,
in case of a joint failure) has been removed, increasing
stress on the remaining lines. The way this redistribution
happens on G˜(`) is governed by power flow physics and
we assume that it occurs instantaneously. Extending this
to dynamic models [45, 46] is a natural future topic, as
transient oscillatory effects may severe the impact of line
failures.
The power flow redistribution amounts to compute a
new matrix V˜ linking the power injections and the new
power flows, which can be constructed analogously to
V [33]. The most likely power flow configuration on G˜(`)
after redistribution is f˜ (`) = V˜p(`).
In the special case of an isolated failure (say of line
`) it is enough to calculate the vector φ(`) ∈ Rm−1 of
(normalized) redistribution coefficients, known as line
outage distribution factors (LODF) [47]. The quantity φ(`)j
takes values in [−1, 1], and |φ(`)j | represents the percentage
of power flowing in line ` that is redirected to line j
after the failure of the former. The most likely power
flow configuration on G˜(`) after redistribution then equals
f˜ (`) = {f (`)k }k 6=` + f (`)` φ(`), where f (`)` = ±1 depending
on the way the power flow is most likely to exceed the
threshold 1. The power flow configuration f˜ (`) can be
efficiently used to determine which lines subsequently fail,
by checking for which k we have |f˜ (`)k | ≥ 1, see [33].
There is much evidence that failures propagate non-
locally in power grids [48–52]. To analyze this in our
framework we first consider a ring network with µ = 0
and Σp = I. In this network there are two paths along
which power can flow between any two nodes, using the
convention that a positive flow corresponds to a counter-
clockwise direction. If line ` fails, the power originally
flowing on line ` must now flow on the remaining path
4(a) After the emergent failure of line 27
(red) six additional lines (orange) fail,
4pm.
(b) Most likely power injection p(`) causing the isolated failure of line 720 (red),
and subsequent failures (orange). The bus sizes reflect how much p(`) deviates
from µ at 11am (red positive deviations, blue negative). Left, with correlation in
noise); Right, without correlation in noise (setting to 0 all the off-diagonals of Σp).
FIG. 2
in the opposite direction. To make this rigorous we show
in [33] that φ(`)k = −1 for every k 6= `. As power flows
must sum to zero by Kirchhoff’s law, neighboring lines
tend to have positively correlated power flows, while flows
on distant lines exhibit negative correlations. Hence, the
power injections that make the power flows in line ` exceed
the line threshold (say by becoming larger than 1) also
make the power flows in the antipodal half of the network
negative. These will go beyond the line threshold −1 after
the power flow redistributes, cf. Fig. 3.
1
1/7
-13/35
-19/35
-13/35
1/7
failed
1/7-1
-13/35-1
-19/35-1
-13/35-1
1/7-1
FIG. 3: Left: most likely power injections p(`) leading to the
failure of line ` (orange), visualized using the color and size of the
nodes (red positive deviations, blue negative), together with power
flows f (`)
k
. Right: situation after the power flow redistribution with
three subsequent failures and the values f˜ (`)
k
= f (`)
k
− 1, k 6= `.
In the SciGRID example, Fig. 2a shows how the emer-
gent isolated failure of line ` = 27 causes the failure of
six more lines k1, . . . , k6, two of which are far way from
the original failure. For validation purposes, we found
numerically that P(line kj fails ∀j = 1, . . . , 6 | |f27| ≥
1) ≥ 0.9987. Conversely, the failure of line 27 under the
nominal power injection profile leads to only two subse-
quent failures. The nontypical input caused other lines to
be more loaded than expected, and these lines get more
vulnerable as the cascades progresses, resulting in more
subsequent failures.
To validate this insight, we have looked at the first two
stages of emergent cascading failures for several IEEE
test networks, and compare them with those of classical
cascading failures, obtained using nominal power injection
values rather than the most likely ones and deterministic
removal of the initial failing line; see [33] for a precise de-
scription of the experiment. As before, emergent cascades
tend to lead to a higher number of subsequent failures in
each stage.
A non-diagonal noise matrix Σp exacerbates these ef-
fects. Experiments (see Fig. 2b) with our SciGRID case
study suggest that, if there is a correlation in noise, for ex-
ample due to fluctuations in weather patterns, the number
of subsequent failures can become higher. Furthermore,
it is easier for a failure to be triggered by many small
disturbances across the network, compared to the case
where these correlations are not taken into account. In
the latter case, we see a more local effect with relatively
larger disturbances.
In conclusion, we illustrated the potential of concepts
from statistical physics and large deviations theory to an-
alyze emergent failures and their propagation in complex
networks. Exogenous noise disturbances at the nodes,
potentially amplified by correlations, push a complex
network into a critical state in which edge failure may
emerge. Large deviations theory provides a tool to rank
such failures according to their likelihood and predicts
how such failures most likely occur and propagate. When
an emergent edge failure occurs, its impact on the network
can be more significant than a purely exogenous failure,
possibly resulting in cascades that propagate quicker than
in classical vulnerability analysis.
The accuracy of the small noise limit has been validated
in our case study, making the case for applying large
deviations techniques to more realistic models. In [33]
we propose a promising economic application of our
approach, showing how our framework can shed light
on the trade-off between network reliability and societal
costs.
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1Supplemental Material for:
Emergent failures and cascades in power grids: a statistical physics perspective
POWER GRID MODEL AND DC
APPROXIMATION
We model the power grid network as a connected
weighted graph G with n nodes, modeling buses, and
m edges, representing the transmission lines. We make
use of the DC approximation, which is commonly used in
high-voltage transmission system analysis [34–37].
Choosing an arbitrary but fixed orientation of the trans-
mission lines, the network structure is described by the
edge-vertex incidence matrix C ∈ Rm×n defined as
C`,i =

1 if ` = (i, j),
−1 if ` = (j, i),
0 otherwise.
Denote by β` = βi,j = βj,i > 0 the weight of edge
` = (i, j), corresponding to the susceptance of that trans-
mission line. By convention, we set βi,j = βj,i = 0 if there
is no transmission line between i and j. Denote by B the
m×m diagonal matrix defined as B = diag(β1, . . . , βm).
The network topology and weights are simultaneously
encoded in the weighted Laplacian matrix of the graph
G, defined as L = C>BC or entry-wise as
Li,j =
{
−βi,j if i 6= j,∑
k 6=j βi,k if i = j.
All the rows of L sum up to zero and thus the matrix L is
singular. The eigenvalue zero has multiplicity one (thanks
to the assumption that the graph G is connected) and
the corresponding eigenvector is 1. Denote by v2, . . . ,vn
the remaining eigenvectors of L, which are orthogonal to
1 and thus have all zero sum.
According to the DC approximation, the relation be-
tween any zero-sum vector of power injections p ∈ Rn
and the phase angles θ ∈ Rn they induce in the network
nodes can be written in matrix form as
p = Lθ,
Defining L+ ∈ Rn×n as the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse
of L, we can rewrite this as
θ = L+p. (S1)
This latter identity is particularly useful in our context,
since it holds for any vector of power injections p ∈ Rn,
even if it has no zero sum. Indeed, decomposing the
vector p using the basis of eigenvectors 1,v2, . . . ,vn of
L+ one notices that the only component of p with non-
zero sum belongs to the null space of L+ (generated by
the eigenvector 1).
This mathematical fact corresponds to the assumption
that the power grid has automatic redispatch/balancing
mechanisms, in which the total power injection mismatch
is distributed uniformly among all the nodes, thus ensur-
ing that the total net power injection is always zero.
Denote by J ∈ Rn×n the matrix with all entries equal
to one. Exploiting the eigenspace structure of L, L+ can
be calculated as
L+ =
(
L + 1
n
J
)−1
− 1
n
J,
In the literature, instead of L+ it is commonly used
another matrix L¯, calculated using the inverse of the
(n− 1)× (n− 1) sub-matrix obtained from L by means
of deleting the first row and first column. In our method
we are implicitly choosing an average value of zero as
a reference for the nodes voltage phase angles, while in
the classical one the first node is used as reference by
setting is phase angle equal to zero. We remark that
these two procedure are equivalent if one is interested in
the line power flows, as these latter depend only on the
phase angle differences. However, the matrix L¯ does not
account for the distributed slack, which needs to added
by post-multiplying by the matrix S = I− 1nJ ∈ Rn×n.
The real line power flows fˆ are related with the phase
angles θ via the linear relation fˆ = BCθ. In view of
Eq. (S1), the line power flow fˆ can be written as a linear
transformation of the power injections p, i.e.
fˆ = BCL+p. (S2)
It is convenient to look at the normalized line power flow
vector f ∈ Rm, defined component-wise as f` = fˆ`/C` for
every ` = 1, . . . ,m, where C` is the line threshold of line `,
which is assumed to be given. Line thresholds are in place
because a protracted current overload would heat up the
line, causing sag, loss of tensile strength and eventually
mechanical failure. If this happens, the failure may cause
a global redistribution of the line power flows which could
trigger cascading failures and blackouts.
The relation between line power flows and normalized
power flows can be rewritten as f = Wfˆ , where W is
the m×m diagonal matrix W = diag(C−11 , . . . , C−1m ). In
view of Eq. (S2), the normalized power flows f can be
expressed in terms of the power injections p as
f = Vp,
where V = WBCL+ ∈ Rm×n.
2Stochastic and deterministic injections
We now briefly outline how the model presented above
can be extended to a setting where only a subset of nodes
houses stochastic power injections (modeling wind and
solar parks), while the other nodes house deterministic in-
jections (corresponding to conventional controllable power
plants).
First, we introduce the following notation: if z is a
n-dimensional multivariate Gaussian random vector with
mean λ and covariance matrix Λ, it will be denoted by
z ∼ Nn(λ,Λ).
Define the following:
ns number of stochastic buses,
nd number of deterministic buses,
Is ⊆ {1, . . . , n} indices of stochastic buses,
Id ⊆ {1, . . . , n} indices of deterministic buses,
ps = (pi)i∈Is ∈ Rns stochastic power injection,
pd = (pi)i∈Id ∈ Rnd deterministic power injection,
Vs ∈ Rm×ns matrix consisting of the
columns of V indexed by Is,
Vd ∈ Rm×nd matrix consisting of the
columns of V indexed by Id,
fs = Vsps ∈ Rm stochastic component of f,
fd = Vdpd ∈ Rm deterministic component of f.
If a bus hosts both stochastic and deterministic genera-
tors, it is considered a stochastic bus. Stochastic power
injections are modelled by mean of a ns-dimensional mul-
tivariate Gaussian random vector with mean µs ∈ Rns
and covariance matrix Σp ∈ Rns×ns , which we denote by
ps ∼ Nns(µs, εΣp),
With the previous notation, the normalized power flows
can be decomposed as f = fs + fd = Vsps + fd, where
fs ∼ Nm(νs, εΣf ),
νs = Vsµs,
Σf = VsΣpV>s . (S3)
The nominal power flows values are thus equal to ν = νs+
fd. The decay rate for an overload in line `, analogously
to formula (6) in the Main Body of the paper, is given by
I` = inf
ps∈Rns : |eˆ>` (Vsps+fd)|≥1
1
2(ps − µs)
>Σ−1p (ps − µs).
Provided that ν` 6= 0, the solution is unique and reads
p(`)s =
(sign(ν`)− ν`)
σ2`
ΣpV>s eˆ` + µs ∈ Rns , (S4)
where σ2` = (Σf )`,`. The corresponding most likely real-
ization for power flows reads
f (`) = Vsp(`)s + fd
= (sign(ν`)− ν`)
σ2`
VsΣpV>s eˆ` + νs + fd ∈ Rm. (S5)
In the next section we prove these claims for the particular
case of ns = n.
LARGE DEVIATIONS PRINCIPLES FOR
FAILURE EVENTS
Gaussian case
In this section we provide proofs for Eqs. (3)-(7) in
the Main Body. For the sake of clarity we present here
only the proofs for the case n = ns, and we remark
that Eqs. (S4)-(S5) in the Supplemental Material can be
proved along similar lines. In the following, we write pε
and fε to stress the dependence of the power injections
and of the line power flows on the noise parameter ε.
Proposition 1. Assume that maxj=1,...,m |νj | < 1. Then,
for every ` = 1, . . . ,m, the sequence of line power flows
(fε)ε>0 satisfies the large deviations principle
lim
ε→0
ε logP(|(fε)`| ≥ 1) = − (1− |ν`|)
2
2σ2`
= −I`. (S6)
The most likely power injection configuration p(`) ∈ Rn
given the event |(fε)`| ≥ 1 is the solution of the variational
problem
p(`) = arg inf
p∈Rn : |eˆ>
`
Vp|≥1
1
2(p− µ)
>Σ−1p (p− µ), (S7)
which, when ν` 6= 0, can be explicitly computed as
p(`) = µ+ (sign(ν`)− ν`)
σ2`
ΣpV>eˆ`.
The next proposition shows that the conditional distri-
bution of pε, given |(fε)`| ≥ 1, gets concentrated around
p(`) exponentially fast as ε→ 0, motivating the interpreta-
tion of p(`) as the most likely power injection configuration
given the failure of line `.
Proposition 2. Assume that maxk=1,...,m |νk| < 1, and
that ν` 6= 0. Then, for all nodes i = 1, . . . , n, and for all
δ > 0,
lim
ε→0
ε logP((pε)i /∈ (p(`)i − δ, p(`)i + δ)
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1) < 0.
The line power flows corresponding to the power injec-
tion configuration p(`) can be calculated as
f (`) = Vp(`) = ν + (sign(ν`)− ν`)
σ2`
VΣpV>eˆ` ∈ Rm.
3We observe that the vectors p(`) and f (`) are equal to the
conditional expectation of the power injections pε and
power flows fε, respectively, conditional on the failure
event f` = sign(ν`), namely
p(`) = E[pε | (fε)` = sign(ν`)], (S8)
f (`) = E[fε | (fε)` = sign(ν`)].
In particular, for every k = 1, . . . ,m,
f
(`)
k = νk + (sign(ν`)− ν`)
Cov(f`, fk)
Var(f`)
.
Note that the case ν` = 0 has been excluded only for
compactness. Indeed, in this special case the variational
problem (S7) has two solutions, p(`,+) and p(`,−). This
can be easily explained by observing that if the power
flow on line ` has mean ν` = 0, then it is equally likely
for the overload event {|f`| ≥ 1} to occur as {f` ≥ 1}
or as {f` ≤ −1} and the most likely power injection
configurations that trigger them can be different.
The previous proposition immediately yields the large
deviations principle also for the first line failure event
‖fε‖∞ ≥ 1, which reads
lim
ε→0
ε logP(||fε||∞ ≥ 1) = − min
`=1,...,m
(1− |ν`|)2
2σ2`
.
Indeed, the decay rate for the event that at least one
line fails is equal to the minimum of the decay rates for
the failure of each line. The most likely power injections
configuration that leads to the event ‖fε‖∞ ≥ 1 is p(`∗)
with `∗ = arg min`=1,...,m
(1−|ν`|)2
2σ2
`
.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (Z(i))i∈N be a sequence
of i.i.d. m-dimensional multivariate normal vectors
Z(i) ∼ Nm(ν,Σf ), and let Sk = 1k
∑k
i=1 Z
(i) be the se-
quence of the partial sums. By setting ε = 1k , it immedi-
ately follows that that fε
d= Sk, where
d= denotes equality
in distribution. Denote g(p) = 12 (p − µ)>Σ−1p (p − µ).
Following [43, Section 3.D], we get
lim
ε→0
ε logP((fε)` ≥ 1) = lim
k→∞
1
k
logP((Sk)` ≥ 1) =
= − inf
p∈Rn : eˆ>
`
Vp≥1
g(p) = − (1− ν`)
2
2σ2`
, (S9)
lim
ε→0
ε logP((fε)` ≤ −1) = lim
k→∞
1
k
logP((Sk)` ≤ −1) =
= − inf
p∈Rn : eˆ>
`
Vp≤−1
g(p) = − (−1− ν`)
2
2σ2`
. (S10)
The optimizers of problems (S9) and (S10) are easily
computed respectively as as
p(`,+) = µ+ (1− ν`)
σ2`
ΣpV>eˆ`,
p(`,−) = µ+ (−1− ν`)
σ2`
ΣpV>eˆ`.
Note that trivially
inf
p∈Rn : |eˆ>
`
Vp|≥1
g(p) =
= min
{
inf
p∈Rn : eˆ>
`
Vp≥1
g(p), inf
p∈Rn : eˆ>
`
Vp≤−1
g(p)
}
,
and thus identities (S6) and (S7) immediately follow.
Proof of Proposition 2. We have
log P((pε)i /∈ (p(`)i − δ, p(`)i + δ)
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1)
= log P((pε)i /∈ (p(`)i − δ, p(`)i + δ), |(fε)`| ≥ 1)
− logP(|(fε)`| ≥ 1).
Denote g(p) = 12 (p− µ)>Σ−1p (p− µ). From large devia-
tions theory, it holds that that
lim
ε→0
ε logP(|(fε)`| ≥ 1) = − inf
p∈Rn : |eˆ>
`
Vp|≥1
g(p) (S11)
lim
ε→0
ε logP((pε)i /∈ (p(`)i − δ, p(`)i + δ), |(fε)`| ≥ 1) =
= − inf
p∈Rn : |eˆ>` Vp|≥1,
|pi−p(`)i |≥δ
g(p). (S12)
Define the corresponding decay rates as
I` = inf
p∈Rn : |eˆ>
`
Vp|≥1
g(p), J` = inf
p∈Rn : |eˆ>` Vp|≥1,
|pi−p(`)i |≥δ
g(p).
Then we can rewrite
lim
ε→0
ε logP((pε)k /∈ (p(`)i −δ, p(`)i +δ)
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1) = −J`+I`,
and, therefore, the claim is equivalent to proving that
J` > I`. Notice that the feasible set of the minimization
problem (S12) is strictly contained in that of the problem
(S11), implying that J` ≥ I`.
Recall that p(`) is the unique optimal solution of (S11),
and let pˆ(`) be an optimal solution of (S12). Clearly
pˆ(`) is feasible also for problem (S11). If it was the case
that J` = I`, then pˆ(`) would be an optimal solution for
(S11), and thus by uniqueness (g(p) is strictly convex)
pˆ(`) = p(`). But this leads to a contradiction, since pˆ(`)
is by construction such that |pˆi− pˆ(`)i | ≥ δ. Hence J` > I`
and we conclude that
lim
ε→0
ε logP((pε)i /∈ (p(`)i −δ, p(`)i +δ)
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1) < 0.
Extension to non-Gaussian case
In this section we briefly describe how to extend the
analyis to the non-Gaussian scenario. Consider a model
for the power injection vector given by
pε = µ+
√
εX,
4where µ ∈ Rn and X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is a random vector
with mean 0 and log-moment generating function
logM(s) = logE[e〈s,X〉].
The power flows vector is thus given by fε = V pε. Define
the Fenchel-Legendre (also known as the convex conju-
gate) transform of logM(s), i.e.
Λ∗(x) = sup
s∈Rn
(〈s,x〉 − logM(s)).
Then, for every ` = 1, . . . ,m, the sequence (fε)ε>0 satisfies
the large deviations principle (see [39])
lim
ε→0
ε logP(|(fε)`| ≥ 1) = − inf
x∈Rn : |eˆ>
`
V(µ+x)|≥1
Λ∗(x),
and the most likely power injection configuration p(`) ∈
Rn given the event |(fε)`| ≥ 1 is
p(`) = µ+ arg inf
x∈Rn : |eˆ>
`
V(µ+x)|≥1
Λ∗(x).
The rest of the analysis can then be carried out along
similar lines as we did for the Gaussian case.
POWER FLOW REDISTRIBUTION
For every line ` define J (`) to be the collection of lines
that fail jointly with ` as
J (`) = {k : |f (`)k | ≥ 1}.
Let j(`) = |J (`)| be its cardinality and note that j(`) ≥ 1
as trivially ` always belongs to J (`). Denote by G˜(`) the
graph obtained from G by removing all the lines in J (`).
Let us focus first on the case of the isolated failure
of line `, that is when J (`) = {`}. In this case G˜(`) =
G(V,E \{`}) is the graph obtained from G after removing
the line ` = (i, j). Provided that the power injections
remain unchanged, the power flows redistribute among the
remaining lines. Using the concept of effective resistance
matrix R ∈ Rn×n and under the DC approximation,
in [53–55] it is proven that alternative paths for the power
to flow from node i to j exist (i.e., G˜(`) is still connected)
if and only if βi,jRi,j 6= 1. In other words, βi,jRi,j = 1 can
only occur in the scenario where line ` = (i, j) is a bridge,
i.e., its removal results in the disconnection of the original
graph G in two components. If G˜(`) is still a connected
graph, the power flows after redistribution f¯ (`) ∈ Rm−1
are related with the original line flows f ∈ Rm in the
network G by the relation
f¯
(`)
k = fk + f
(`)
` φ
(`)
k , for every k 6= `,
where f (`)` = ±1 depending on the way the power flow on
line ` exceeded the threshold 1. If ` = (i, j) and k = (a, b)
the coefficient φ(`)k ∈ R can be computed as
φ
(`)
k = φ(i,j),(a,b) = βk ·
C`
Ck
· Ra,j −Ra,i +Rb,i −Rb,j2(1− β`Ri,j) ,
(S13)
The ratio C`/Ck appears in the latter formula since we
work with normalized line power flows and we correspond-
ingly defined φ(`) = {φ(`)k }k 6=` to be the normalized ver-
sion of the classical line outage distribution factors (LODF,
[47]). Moreover, we define the most likely power flows
configuration f˜ (`) ∈ Rm−1 after redistribution as
f˜
(`)
k = f
(`)
k + f
(`)
` φ
(`)
k , for every k 6= `. (S14)
Ring topology
We now focus on a particular topology, namely the
ring on n nodes, which we use as an illustrative example
to show the non-locality of cascades in the Main Body.
In this topology, nodes are placed on a ring and each
node is connected to its previous and subsequent neigh-
bor. Denote the set of nodes as N = {1, . . . ,m} and
the set of lines L = {l1, . . . , ln}, where l1 = (n, 1), l2 =
(1, 2), . . . , ln = (n−1, n). It is easy to prove that, in a ring
network with homogeneous line thresholds and unitary
susceptances, φ`,k = −1 for every ` 6= k.
Lemma 1. Consider a ring network with homogeneous
line thresholds (C` = C for every line `) and homogeneous
unitary susceptances (β` = 1 for every line `). Then
i) The effective resistance between a pair of nodes i, j
is given by
Ri,j =
|j − i|(n− |j − i|)
n
. (S15)
ii) For every pair of lines lk = (k− 1, k), l` = (`− 1, `),
with k 6= `, the LODF is constant and equal to
φ(k−1,k),(`−1,`) = −1.
Proof. i) See identity (4) in [56]. ii) First, observe that
the effective resistance between two adjacent nodes i and
j = i + 1 in a circuit graph is equal to Ri,j = n−1n ,
thanks to Eq. (S15). After a straightforward calculation,
and using that β` = 1, C` = C for all lines `, Eq. (S13)
becomes
φ(k−1,k),(`−1,`) = − 2
2n
(
1− n−1n
) = −1.
General topology
Going back to the case of a general network topology
and any type of failures, isolated or joint, the power flows
5after redistribution f¯ (`) ∈ Rm−j(`) are related with the
power injections p ∈ Rn by the relation
f¯ (`) = V˜(`)p,
where the (m− j(`))× n matrix V˜(`) can be constructed
analogously to V, but considering the altered graph G˜(`)
instead of G. We define the most likely power flow con-
figuration f˜ (`) after redistribution as
f˜ (`) = V˜(`)p(`),
which generalizes Eq. (S14) to any kind of failure, isolated
of joint. The next proposition shows that it is enough
to look at the vector f˜ (`) to determine whether a line
that survived at the first cascade stage (i.e., that did not
fail jointly with `) will fail with high probability or not
after the power redistribution (i.e., at the second cascade
stage).
Proposition 3. Assume that maxk=1,...,m |νk| < 1, and
that ν` 6= 0. Then, for all lines k ∈ E \ J (`), and for all
δ > 0,
lim
ε→0
ε logP((f¯ (`)ε )k /∈ (f˜ (`)k − δ, f˜ (`)k + δ)
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1) < 0.
In particular, if |f˜ (`)k | ≥ 1, then
P(|(f¯ (`)ε )k| ≥ 1
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1)→ 1 as ε→ 0,
exponentially fast in 1/ε.
Proof. Let Aε,k denote the event Aε,k =
{(f¯ (`)ε )k /∈ (f˜ (`)k − δ, f˜ (`)k + δ)}, and define Q =
limε→0 ε logP(Aε,k
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1). The proof that Q < 0 is
analogous to the proof of Prop. 2. For the second part,
it follows from limε→0 ε logP(Aε,k
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1) = Q that
for every η > 0 there exists a ε¯ such that, for every ε < ε¯,
Q− η ≤ ε logP(Aε,k
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1) ≤ Q+ η,
and thus
exp
(Q− η
ε
)
≤ P(Aε,k
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1) ≤ exp(Q+ η
ε
)
.
Let Acε,k denote the complementary event of Aε,k. Since
|f˜ (`)k | ≥ 1, for δ sufficiently small we have
Acε,k = {|(f¯ (`)ε )k − f˜ (`)k | < δ} ⊆ {|(f¯ (`)ε )k| ≥ 1},
yielding
P(|(f¯ (`)ε )k| ≥ 1
∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1) ≥P(Acε,k ∣∣ |(fε)`| ≥ 1)
≥ 1− exp
(Q+ η
ε
)
.
Since Q < 0, the result follows.
APPLICATION: SCIGRID GERMAN NETWORK
We now demonstrate our methodology in the case of a
real-world power grid and a realistic system state.
Dataset Description
We perform our experiments using PyPSA, a free soft-
ware toolbox for power system analysis [57]. We use the
dataset described in [58, 59], which provides a model of
the German electricity system based on SciGRID and
OpenStreetMap [41, 60].
The dataset includes load/generation time series and
geographical locations of the nodes, differentiating be-
tween renewable and conventional generation. It also
provides data for transmission lines limits, transform-
ers, generation capacity and marginal costs, allowing us
to couple our theoretical analysis with realistic Optimal
Power Flow (OPF, [42]) computations. The time-series
provide hourly data for the entire year 2011. For more
technical information on the dataset, we refer to [58, 59].
The SciGRID German network consists of 585 buses,
1423 generators including conventional power plants and
wind and solar parks, 38 pump storage units, 852 lines
and 96 transformers. For the analysis carried out in
this paper, storage units are not included and we ex-
clude transformer failures. The renewable generators
are divided in three classes, solar, wind onshore and
wind offshore. Each bus can house multiple generators,
both renewable and conventional, but it is limited to
at most one renewable generator for each class. Let
Nw.off,Nw.on,Nsol denote the set of buses housing, re-
spectively, wind offshore, wind onshore and solar genera-
tors, with |Nw.off| = 5, |Nw.on| = 488, |Nsol| = 489, and
Nw.off ⊆ Nw.on ⊆ Nsol. The remaining 96 buses house
441 conventional generators.
Let ns = 489 denote the total number of buses housing
renewable generators. If a bus houses both renewable and
conventional generators, it will be considered a stochas-
tic bus for our decomposition formulation. We model
stochastic net power injections by means of a multivariate
Gaussian random vector ps ∼ Nns(µs, εΣp).
The distinction between the noise parameter ε and the
covariance matrix Σp is relevant only for the theoretical
analysis (where we take the limit ε→ 0 while the matrix
Σp is fixed), since as far as the numerical case study is
concerned, all the results are obtained by using the prod-
uct εΣp, which is directly estimated from the SciGRID
data. In the following, we will thus take ε = 1 and refer
to the covariance matrix of ps simply as Σp.
6Data-based model for µs
In order to get a realistic nominal line flows value ν,
we perform a linear OPF relative to the day 01/01/2011,
for different hours of the day. A linear OPF consists of
minimizing the total cost of generation, subject to energy
balance, generation and transmission lines constraints, un-
der the assumptions of the DC approximations. In order
to model a heavily-loaded but not overloaded system, in
the OPF we scale the true line limits C` by a contingency
factor of λ = 0.7. This is a common practice in power
engineering that allows room for reactive power flows and
stability reserve.
More precisely, let g(i) be the generation at bus i as
outputted by the OPF for a given hour, and let us write it
as g(i) = gr(i) + gd(i), with gr(i) the power produced by
renewable generators attached to the bus, and gd(i) the
power supplied by conventional generators. If the demand
at bus i is given by d(i), then the average stochastic power
injection vector µs ∈ Rns is modeled as
(µs)i = gr(i) + gd(i)− d(i), i = 1, . . . , ns,
while the deterministic power injection reads pi = gd(i)−
d(i) for i ∈ Id.
Data-based model for Σp
In order to model the fluctuations of renewable genera-
tion around the nominal values, and thus estimate Σp, we
use realistic hourly values of wind and solar energy pro-
duction to fit a stochastic model. We then use the steady-
state covariance of the model residuals as an estimate
for Σp. Following [61], we choose to use AutoRegressive-
Moving-Average (ARMA) models, which we describe in
details below.
Note that we do not aim to find the best possible
stochastic model for renewable generation, which is be-
yond the scope of this paper, but instead to provide an
estimate for the covariance matrix Σp in order to validate
our theoretical results, which are asymptotically valid in a
small-noise regime. We speculate that more sophisticated
models, and/or data on smaller time-scales, may lead to
smaller values for the correlations in Σp, thus getting
closer to the small noise limit.
We now describe the estimation procedure for Σp (as
mentioned before we normalize ε = 1 in our empirical
study). The SciGRID dataset contains time series
yw.off ∈ RM×5,yw.on ∈ RM×488,ysol ∈ RM×489,
for the available power output of wind offshore, wind
onshore and solar generators, for each hour of the year
2011, accounting for a total of M = 8760 measurements
for each generator [58]. For each time series, y(·)(t, j)
denote the available power output at time t for the j-th
generator of a given type, in MW units.
Wind power model
As a pre-processing step, we merge together the two
time series yw.off,yw.on by summing up the onshore and
offshore wind power at the buses Nw.off ⊆ Nw.on. This
yields the time series of wind power production
yw(t, j) = yw.on(t, j) + 1j∈Nw.offyw.off(t, j),
where 1{} is the indicator function of the event in the
bracket, taking value 1 if the event is satisfied, and 0,
otherwise.
We select one portion of the data {1, . . . , T} ⊆
{1, . . . ,M}, corresponding to the month of January, to be
used to fit the model. For each windpark j, following [61]
we consider an ARMA(1,24) model of the form
x(t, j) =a1,jx(t− 1, j) + e(t, j)
+m1,je(t− 1, j) + . . .+m24,je(t− 24, j),
where x(t−1, j) is the auto-regressive term, and e(t−k, j),
k = 1, . . . , 24, are the white-noise error terms. For each
windpark j, we fit the above model to the wind power data
{yw(t, j)}t=1:T in R using the function arima, and con-
sider the time series of the residuals ew(1, j), . . . , ew(T, j).
The empirical variance of the residuals is used as proxy
for the variance of the output of windpark j, namely
(Σw)jj = V̂ar(ew(1, j), . . . , ew(T, j)),
where V̂ar denotes the empirical variance. In a similar
way, the empirical covariance of the residuals is used to
model the covariance between the output of windparks i
and j, i 6= j, namely
(Σw)ij = Ĉov
(
{ew(t, i)}t=1:T , {ew(t, j)}t=1:T
)
,
where Ĉov denotes the empirical covariance.
Solar power model
State-of-the-art models for solar irradiance often com-
bine statistical techniques with cloud motion analysis and
numerical weather prediction (NWP) models, see [62] for
a review. Since the available data in our case study are
limited to historical records for power production of solar
generators, and do not include any weather data, we used
the purely statistical model ARMA(p,q), which has been
used succesfully in [63].
Regarding the orders p, q of the ARMA model, af-
ter some exploratory analysis we decided to use an
ARMA(24,24) model with all parameters fixed to 0, ex-
cept for the ones corresponding to the seven hours before,
and the one corresponding to twenty-four hours before.
The rationale behind this choice is that by using the value
7corresponding to twenty-four hours before, we capture
the dependency on the hour of the day, while the values
from 7 hours before capture the shape of the current day.
More precisely, the model reads
x(t, j) = a1,jx(t− 1, j) + . . .+ a7,jx(t− 7, j)
+ a24,jx(t− 24, j)
+ e(t, j) +m1,je(t− 1, j) + . . .+m7,je(t− 7, j)
+m24,je(t− 24, j).
For each solar park j, we fit the above model to the
solar power data (ysol(t, j))t=1:T , using again the R func-
tion arima, and consider the time series of the residuals
(esol(t,j))t∈D, where D ⊆ {1, . . . , T} denotes the set of
daylight hours of January 2011. The covariance matrix
for the solar power generation is obtained as
(Σsol)ij = Ĉov
(
(esol(t, i))t∈D, (esol(t, j))t∈D
)
.
Since we perform numerical experiments for different
hours of the day 01/01/2011, we need to model renew-
able fluctuations taking into account whether or not we
consider a daylight hour, as there is no solar energy pro-
duction before sunrise and after sunset. In view of this,
and assuming that the residuals for the wind and solar
models are independent (see [64]), we model the covari-
ance matrix relative to an hour h as
Σp(h) = Σw + 1h∈D1Σsol,
where D1 ⊆ {1, . . . , 24} denotes the set of daylight hours
of 01/01/2011.
The magnitude of power injections noise at bus i is
quantified by the standard deviation
√
(Σp)ii, expressed
as a percentage of the combined installed capacity of wind
and solar generators located at bus i1. In our numerical
study, we find that for daylight hours the mean of these
standard deviations across all buses is 8.5%, while during
nighttime the mean reduces to 5%.
Data-based model for Σf
In view of Eq. (S3), the covariance matrix for the line
power flows fs is calculated as Σf = VsΣpV>s . The mag-
nitude of power flows noise is quantified by the standard
deviations σ` =
√
(Σf )``. Since the nominal values for
the power flows ν` have been standardized as fractions of
line thresholds, and thus range within the interval [−1, 1],
the values of σ` describe the magnitude of the power flows
noise as a percentage of the corresponding line thresh-
old. In our numerical study, we find that for daylight
1 We note that normalizing the error using the installed capacity
of a generator is standard in the literature [65].
hours the power flow standard deviations lie within the
range [0.00007, 0.14219], with mean 0.0228, while dur-
ing nighttime the range is [0.00001, 0.14203], with mean
0.0131.
German network: Ranking of most vulnerable lines
In Figs. S1-S2 are reported, respectively, a heatmap for
the values of normalized line flows |ν`| and for the true
failure probabilities P(|f`| ≥ 1) for every transmission line
in the German network, relative to the hour 11am of the
day 01/01/2011, and for an effective line limit factor of
λ = 0.7.
FIG. S1: Heatmap visualizing the nominal power flows values ν`
for the German network at 11am.
FIG. S2: Heatmap visualizing the logarithm of the exact overload
probabilities log10 P(|f`| ≥ 1) for the German network at 11am.
8By comparing Fig. S1 and Fig. S2, we see that a large
|ν`| does not necessarily imply a higher chance of fail-
ure, suggesting that decay rates are a better indicator
of system vulnerabilities. The most likely line to fail is
line 361, which connects two buses housing wind farms
(EON Netz and Umspannwerk Kraftwerk Emden). This
line is at capacity (|ν361| = 0.7) and has the highest stan-
dard deviation (σ361 = 0.142). However, we notice that
a large nominal value of |ν`| does not necessarily imply
a high chance of failure. For instance, several lines in
the south of Germany have a moderate to high value |ν`|,
see Fig. S1. In particular, line 310, which connects buses
Vo¨hringen Amprion and Umspannwerk Dellmensingen, is
at capacity (|ν310| = 0.7), but ranks only 66-th out of 852
lines, with a power flow standard deviation almost one
order of magnitude lower than the standard deviation of
the most likely line to fail (σ310 = 0.0182).
Fig. S3 depicts the 5% most likely lines to fail, ranked
according to the large deviations decay rates I` = (1−|ν`|)
2
2σ2
`
,
where σ` = (Σf )`` = (VΣpV>)``. The ranking based on
the large deviations approximation successfully recovers
the most likely lines to fail, and, in fact, yields the same
ordering as the one based on exact probabilities. As an
illustration, in Table I are reported the indexes, the exact
failure probabilities and the decay rates for the 20 most
likely lines to fail at 11 am.
` P(|f`| ≥ 1) I`
361 1.743e-02 2.225
803 8.228e-04 4.954
19 6.783e-04 5.132
27 6.033e-04 5.240
389 4.503e-04 5.511
390 4.460e-04 5.520
670 3.527e-04 5.737
809 7.575e-05 7.177
586 5.574e-05 7.466
587 5.454e-05 7.486
810 2.496e-05 8.225
712 6.440e-06 9.514
682 5.337e-06 9.693
683 5.318e-06 9.697
714 3.876e-06 9.999
715 1.052e-06 11.249
554 4.267e-07 12.117
488 4.209e-07 12.130
707 1.199e-07 13.341
818 1.199e-07 13.341
Table I: Line indexes, exact failure probabilities and
decay rates for the 20 top most vulnerable lines, 11 am.
The large-deviations-based ranking provides a parsimo-
nious way to detect vulnerable lines, and can be used to
FIG. S3: Top 5% most likely lines to fail in the German network
at 11 am. The buses housing stochastic power injections have
different colors depending on the type of renewable sources (blue
for wind offshore, light blue for wind onshore and yellow for solar)
and sizes proportional to the absolute values of the corresponding
nominal injections.
appreciate qualitative differences among different hours
of the day. Table II lists values for total generation (G),
and generation mix for different hours of the day (pw.off
for wind offshore, pw.on for wind onshore and ps for solar).
For example, in the morning there is more solar genera-
tion and moderate demand, while in the afternoon there
is zero solar generation and higher demand.
hour G pw.off pw.on psol
0 am 51.75 GW 1.7 % 35.6 % 0.0%
4 am 44.71 GW 2.0 % 45.6 % 0.0%
8 am 44.83 GW 4.5 % 44.7 % 8.1%
11 am 52.52 GW 4.4 % 32.4 % 17.3%
4 pm 57.56 GW 4.1 % 23.9 % 0.0%
8 pm 54.74 GW 4.1 % 22.9 % 0.0%
Table II: Total generation and renewable percentages for different
hours of the day.
In Fig. S4 the top 5% most likely lines to fail are de-
picted (in red) for four different hours of the day, together
with the nominal values outputted by the OPF for re-
newable generation. By comparing Figs. S4a-S4b and
Figs. S4c-S4d, for example, we see how solar generation
is responsible for an increased number of vulnerable lines
in in the south of Germany.
9(a) 8 am. (b) 11 am.
(c) 4 pm. (d) 8 pm.
FIG. S4: Top 5% most likely lines to fail (in red), together with
nominal stochastic generation values. The buses housing stochastic
power injections have different colors depending on the type of
renewable sources (blue for wind offshore, light blue for wind
onshore and yellow for solar) and sizes proportional to the absolute
values of the corresponding nominal injections.
German network: Most likely power injections
In order to keep the notation light, in the follow-
ing two subsections we omit the subscript s (which
refers to stochastic power injections) from the vectors
µ, p(`), pε, p¯(`)ε .
The small-noise regime theoretical power injections
configuration responsible for the failure of line `, as given
by Eq. (S8), reads p(`) = E[ pε | (fε)` = sign(ν`)]. As an
illustration, Fig. S6 depicts p(`) leading to the isolated
failure of line 720. The bus sizes reflect how much p(`)
deviates from µ, and the color-coding uses red for positive
deviations, blue for negative ones.
In order to validate the accuracy of the large-deviations
approach, we compare p(`) to the pre-limit conditional
expectation of power injections given the failure of line `,
namely
p¯(`)ε = E[ pε | |(fε)`| ≥ 1],
which according to Prop. 2 converges to p(`) in the limit
as ε → 0. As a measure of error, we consider, for each
line `,
err(`) = 1
ns
ns∑
i=1
∣∣∣ (p(`))i − (p¯(`)ε )i
µi
∣∣∣,
which quantifies the difference between p(`) and p¯(`)ε , ex-
pressed as a percentages of the nominal values µ, averaged
across all stochastic nodes. We found that, for the same
hour as in Fig. S6, the average error across all lines is
êrr = 1m
∑m
`=1 err(`) = 0.2%, with a maximum value of
2.6%, see Fig. S5. Table III shows that the errors are
uniformly small across different hours.
FIG. S5: Relative error err(`) at 11 am, for ` = 1, . . . , 852.
hour êrr max err(`)
4 am 0.1% 1.5%
8 am 0.4% 4.6%
11 am 0.2% 2.6%
4 pm 0.1% 2.3%
Table III: Average and maximum err(`) for different hours.
German network: Failure propagation
Fig. S7 shows the emergent isolated failure of line 27.
Such a line is the most likely to fail among those which
upon failure do not disconnect the network and trigger
subsequent failures; specifically, the failure of line 27 (in
red) causes six more lines {k1, . . . , k6} to fail (in orange).
This example shows how the failure spreads non-locally: in
particular, lines 316 and line 602 in the south of Germany
are 394 Km and 517 Km far from the original failure of
line 27.
In view of Prop. 3, the subsequent six failures have been
determined by looking at the vector f˜ (`) = V˜(`)p(`), and
checking whether |f˜ (`)k | ≥ 1 for each line k 6= `. According
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FIG. S6: Representation of the most likely power injection p(`)
causing the isolated failure of the line ` = 720 (orange) at 11 am.
The bus sizes reflect how much p(`) deviates from µ (red for
positive deviations, blue for negative ones).
FIG. S7: The most likely configuration p(27) that leads to the
failure of line ` = 27 (in red), at 4 pm. The sizes of the buses
reflect how much p(27) deviates from µ (red for positive deviations,
blue for negative ones). The failure of such a line causes, after
power redistribution, also the six lines (in orange) to fail.
to Prop. 3, the pre-limit conditional probabilities
P(|(f¯ (`)ε )kj | ≥ 1 | |(fε)`| ≥ 1)
converge exponentially fast to 1 as ε→ 0, and in particular
the cumulative distribution functions
P((f¯ (`)ε )kj ≤ x | |(fε)`| ≥ 1)
converge to the deterministic distribution f˜ (`)kj . In order
to validate our methodology, we numerically evaluate
P(|(f¯ (`)ε )kj | < 1 | |(fε)`| ≥ 1),
for j = 1, . . . , 6, and found that the probability that all
the six lines identified by the large deviations approach
actually fail in the pre-limit is equal to
P(|(f¯ (`)ε )kj | ≥ 1 ∀j = 1, . . . , 6 | |(fε)`| ≥ 1)
≥ 1−
6∑
j=1
P(|(f¯ (`)ε )kj | < 1 | |(fε)`| ≥ 1) = 0.9987.
German network: System security vs System cost
In order to model a heavily-loaded but not overloaded
system, in the OPF we scale the true line limits C` by a
contingency factor of λ ∈ (0, 1). This is a common practice
in power engineering that allows room for reactive power
flows and stability reserve.
We explore the trade-off between system security and
system cost, by varying the contingency factor λ in the
range λ ∈ [0.7, 1]. We evaluate system security by means
of the large deviations approximation for the failure prob-
ability of a given line `,
pr(λ)(`) = exp(−I`(λ)), (S16)
where we emphasize the dependency on λ, and we use the
average Locational Marginal Price (LMP, [66]) and the
maximum LMP at the grid nodes as metrics of system
costs.
Fig. S8 reports the results corresponding to the same
setting as in Fig. S7. From this graph one can, for instance,
immediately infer that making line 27 (the red line in
Fig. S6) ten times as safe will roughly cost 1 €/MWh on
average, while the increase in cost in terms of maximum
price can be much more significant. This example shows
how our large deviations theoretical framework can be a
valuable tool to help designing a safe and reliable network
at minimal cost. However, as Eq. (S16) may not be
accurate, more research in this direction is necessary.
Reducing the security margin does not only influence
the average LMPs and system costs, but also their geo-
graphical distribution. Fig. S9 shows geographically accu-
rate LMPs for two values of λ, one corresponding to a low
effective limit/large security margin system (λ = 0.7) and
the other to a large effective limit/low security margin
system (λ = 0.95). We can see how to a more conservative
system corresponds LMPs which are larger especially in
the south and south-west part of Germany, while in north-
ern Germany the difference is less pronounced. Quoting
[57], this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that
“transmission bottlenecks in the middle of Germany pre-
vent the transportation of this cheap electricity to the
South, where more expensive conventional generators set
the price”.
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FIG. S8: Average LMP (scale on left) and Maximum LMP (right)
vs. log10(pr(λ)(27)) = log10(exp(−I27)), for the German network
at 4pm.
FIG. S9: Geographical distribution of LMPs for λ = 0.7 (left)
and λ = 0.95 (right), at 4pm.
Furthermore, Fig. S10 shows that reducing the system
security margin does not only increases the likelihood of
an overload, but it also increases the number of lines with
a large enough overload probability.
FIG. S10: Number of lines ` with overload probability
pr(λ)(`) ≥ q.
CASCADING ANALYSIS: CLASSICAL VERSUS
EMERGENT FAILURES
As illustrated earlier, the most likely power injections
configuration leading to the emergent failure of a given
line can be used in combination with the power flow redis-
tribution rules to generate the failures triggered by that
initial scenario. By repeating this procedure for all lines,
one can obtain insightful statistics of the first two stages
of emergent cascading failures (ec) and compare them
with those of classical cascading failures (cc), obtained
using nominal power injection values rather than the most
likely ones and deterministic removal of the initial failing
line. We perform numerical experiments using IEEE test
grids. Since several IEEE test-cases do not report real-
istic transmission limits, line thresholds are taken to be
proportional to the average absolute power flow on the
corresponding lines, i.e., C` = (1 + α)|ν`|, where ν` is a
nominal value provided in the dataset, α = 0.25 and Σp
is the identity matrix.
Graph % joint failures E(F ec1 ) E(F ec2 ) E(F cc2 )
IEEE14 65.0% 4.40 8.40 4.95
IEEE30 97.6% 3.73 9.88 4.95
IEEE39 80.4% 4.78 11.39 4.85
IEEE57 88.5% 8.00 19.00 10.44
IEEE96 72.2% 6.70 21.47 7.31
IEEE118 91.6% 10.40 24.53 7.56
IEEE300 87.0% 18.13 39.19 7.42
Table IV: Percentage of joint failures in emergent cascades and
average number of failed lines F1 up to stage 1 and F2 up to stage
2 for emergent cascades (ec) and classical cascades (cc) for some
IEEE test systems.
As shown in Table IV, emergent cascades have a very
high percentage of joint failures and an average number
of failures in the first cascade stage much larger than one
(in classical cascades only one line is removed in the first
cascade stage). Furthermore, the expected total number
of failed lines up to the second cascade stage is significantly
larger for emergent cascades than for classical cascades.
Lastly, failures propagate in emergent cascades on average
a bit less far than in classical cascades, as illustrated by
the statistics of the failure jumping distance in Table V.
Our approach also gives a constructive way to build the
so-called “influence graph” [67–69], in which a directed
edge connects lines ` and `′ if the failure of the line `
triggers (simultaneously or after redistribution) that of
line `′. Fig. S11 shows an example of influence graph
built using our large deviations approach. The cliques
of the influence graph (i.e., its maximal fully connected
subgraphs) can then be used to identify clusters of cosus-
ceptable lines [70], which are the lines that statistically
fail often in the same cascade event.
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Graph E(Dec) E(Dcc) cv(Dec) cv(Dcc)
IEEE14 0.388 0.987 0.600 1.050
IEEE30 0.754 1.198 0.879 1.115
IEEE39 0.898 1.633 0.891 1.149
IEEE57 1.210 2.507 0.863 1.415
IEEE96 1.450 1.781 0.879 0.946
IEEE118 0.679 1.638 0.745 1.169
IEEE300 1.408 2.580 0.806 1.081
Table V: Average and coefficient of variation of the failure
jumping distance D in stage 2 both for emergent cascades (ec) and
classical cascades (cc). The distance between two lines is measured
as the shortest path between any of their endpoints.
FIG. S11: The influence graph of the IEEE 118-bus test system
(in black) built using the first two stages of all cascade realizations
has a deeply different structure than the original network (in blue).
